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sell their labor and fully consume their income. In line with the
empirical literature on investment patterns, we assume that firms’
investment decisions are lumpy and constrained by their financial
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7 INTRODUCTION
Persistent and recurrent fluctuations are features common to all
developed economies. A legion of theories (and models) has tried to pro-
vide convincing explanations of this phenomenon, known in economics
as ‘business cycles.’ However, economists are still divided on the causes
of business fluctuations. According to Zarnowitz (1985, 1997), research-
ers have preferred to explore theoretical possibilities instead of trying to
explain what happen in ‘real-world’ economies. This has contributed to
leave the theory of business cycles with more questions than answers.
The different treatment that economic theory reserves to the stylized
facts concerning microeconomic investment dynamics and business cycle
properties is a paradigmatic example of the problems mentioned above.
For example, at the microeconomic level, firms invest in a lumpy fashion
and their investment choices are constrained by their financial structure.
At the macroeconomic level, the fluctuations of output and aggregate
investment are synchronized, but investment is sensibly more volatile than
output. Nevertheless, the contemporary business cycle literature is
flooded by works that do not even take on board such microeconomic evi-
dence, and hardly explain what happens at the macroeconomic one. The
theoretical arena is in fact dominated nowadays by two streams of the-
ories, namely the Real Business Cycle (RBC) perspective and the New-
Keynesian (NK) paradigm. Since space prevents us from surveying this
vast literature here (on RBC, cf. King and Rebelo (1999) and Stadler
(1994); on NK theories, see Mankiw and Romer (1991) and Greenwald
and Stiglitz (1993)), let us just describe how the two paradigms explain
the rise of business cycles. In RBC models, output fluctuations stem from
exogenous stochastic shocks occurring in a general-equilibrium environ-
ment populated by hyper-rational, representative agents. Conversely, in
NK models, business cycles result from the presence of market imperfec-
tions together with monetary and price shocks.
Even if we are more sympathetic with the NK perspective (the RBC
story is very hard to buy, especially if one considers that recessions are
caused by negative technological shocks), we believe that in both para-
digms the microeconomics that one finds in the models is completely
at odds with empirically observed microeconomic behaviors. For
instance, many models try to separately explain some micro or macro
regularities, but there are almost no works that explain business cycle
stylized facts starting from heterogenous agents mimicking the
empirically observed investment and pricing behaviors of firms.
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7 In this article, we refine upon the model developed in Dosi, Fagiolo,
and Roventini (2006) in order to further fill this theoretical vacuum.
More specifically, we study an economy where: (i) aggregate output
and investment together emerge out the microeconomic, lumpy invest-
ment decisions carried out by boundedly-rational firms; (ii) business
firms are the main source of novelty of the economic system. We dismiss
the representative agent assumption1 shared by both RBC and NK mod-
els and we populate the economic environment with heterogenous agents
that are able to interact in the markets. Moreover, we add a Keynesian
flavor to the model assuming a strong market uncertainty. In this frame-
work, firms have to undertake their investment and price decisions
according to boundedly-rational rules grounded on adaptive expecta-
tions. Finally, we ground the model within the ‘Schumpeterian’ tradition:
technological change occurs in the form of a continuous inflow of
endogenous, firm-level, productivity shocks.
The economy portrayed in the model is populated by firms and by
consumers=workers. The former belong either to a capital-good or a
consumption-good industry. The latter supply labor and consume their
income buying a consumption-good.
We follow an evolutionary, ‘agent-based computational economics’
(ACE) approach2 to model the economic system. In this bottom-up
approach, firms and workers adopt routinized behaviors to take their
decisions and evolve their decisions through time. Microeconomic inter-
actions among agents determine the dynamics of macroeconomic vari-
ables, which we study and compare with empirically observed time
series.
As mentioned, the model that we present here extensively draws
from (Dosi, Fagiolo, and Roventini 2006). We refine and expand our
previous analysis along the following lines. First, we endogenize the
capital-good market structure, by allowing capital- and consumption-
good firms to interact directly. Second, we introduce time in the pro-
duction of machine-tools, introducing a possible source of nonlinearities.
Third, we reserve a more accurate treatment to technical change, letting
capital-good firms search both for new machines and for new production
routines. Fourth, we check the performance of the model with respect to
the inclusion of a nonmarket sector, testing whether its presence is
1See Kirman (1989, 1992) for a sharp critique of the ‘representative agent fallacies.’
2See Section 3 for a detailed presentation of the evolutionary, ACE paradigm.
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7 crucial to match the micro- and macro- stylized facts. Finally, we
continue to model the behavior of firms by introducing some of the
microeconomic regularities described in the previous section. For
instance, we let firms invest in a lumpy fashion.
According to our simulation results, the model is able to generate
aggregate output time series exhibiting both self-sustained growth pat-
terns and persistent business cycles. In addition, the model is able to
reproduce both the business cycle properties (e.g., volatility, auto- and
cross-correlation patterns) of aggregate time series and the microeco-
nomic stylized facts on firm size distributions and firm productivity
dynamics.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide a short
overview of micro and macro empirical evidence. We then discuss the
antecedents and theoretical roots of the model (Section 3). In Section 4
we present the model and in Section 5 we discuss the results generated by
simulation exercises. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
SOME EVIDENCE CONCERNING BUSINESS CYCLES
AND MICROECONOMIC REGULARITIES
As we mentioned above, any business cycle model should be able jointly
to account for several macro ‘stylized facts.’ Moreover, the assumptions
about the behavior of economic agents injected in the model should be at
the very least consistent with the observed microeconomic evidence
about real-world firm behavioral patterns. Let us then begin by briefly
presenting the most salient macro and micro ‘stylized facts,’ as they
emerge out of the relevant, recent, empirical economic literature.
Macro Stylized Facts
The empirical analysis of business cycles requires a careful assessment of
the properties of aggregate output and of the other most important
macro time series (e.g., investment, consumption, change in inventories,
etc.). According to the empirical evidence, developed economies have
been continuously exposed to an alternation of expansions and reces-
sions. The last fifty years have not been an exception. The US and the
other developed countries have experienced a period of robust economic
growth characterized by economic fluctuations. The analysis of the
dynamics of output (and of its components) at the business cycle
frequencies helps to single out this regularity. Indeed, all series exhibit
634 G. DOSI ET AL.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
B
y:
 [R
ov
en
tin
i, 
A
nd
re
a]
 A
t: 
08
:3
4 
14
 S
ep
te
m
be
r 2
00
7 a typical ‘roller coaster’ shape, which signals the recurrent alternation of
expansions and recessions.
The evidence contained in Table 1 gives further support to earlier,
path-breaking analyses by Kuznets (1930) and Burns and Mitchell
(1946), who contributed to single out the following stylized facts3:
SF1 Investment is considerably more volatile than output.
SF2 Consumption is less volatile that output.
SF3 Investment, consumption, and change in inventories tend to be
procyclical and coincident variables.
SF4 Aggregate employment is procyclical, whereas unemployment rate
is counter-cyclical. Both variables seem to be lagging.
Micro Stylized Facts
In turn, the empirical literature on industrial dynamics has successfully
uncovered many robust stylized facts about the microeconomic behavior
of firms. In this section, we briefly examine these statistical regularities,
beginning with the following two ones concerning firm investment
patterns:
SF5 Investment is lumpy.
SF6 Investment is affected by the financial structure of firms.
Let us start with SF5. In a seminal contribution, Doms and Dunne
(1998), employing US plant level data, show that firms invest in a lumpy
fashion. For example, in a given year, 51.9% of all plants increase their capi-
tal stock by less than 2.5%, while the 11% of them raise it by more than
20%.Within-plant investment patterns also show that themajority of plants’
investment is concentrated in just 3 years out of the 16 under analysis.
The microeconomic investment lumpiness does not seem to be
completely washed away by the aggregation process. There is indeed a
3The stylized facts listed below are robust to alternative detrending techniques. See, for
example, Stock and Watson (1999), Agresti and Mojon (2001), and Napoletano, Roventini,
and Sapio (2006), who apply a bandpass filter (Baxter and King 1999) to US data ranging
from 1956Q1 to 1996Q4, EMU series going from 1970Q1 to 2000Q3, and Italian=US data
for the period 1970Q1-2002Q3, respectively. See also Kydland Prescott (1990) who employ a
HP filter to US data from 1954Q1 to 1989Q4.
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7 positive correlation between aggregate investment dynamics and the
number of plants experiencing big investment spikes.
In the empirical literature, there is also a great deal of evidence
supporting SF6. Beginning with the influential contribution of Fazzari,
Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), many works4 have found that firm invest-
ment choices may be constrained by their financial structure. Hence, if
information asymmetries introduce imperfections in capital markets,
the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem does not hold and the finan-
cial structure of firms ceases to be neutral. This implies that the cost
of external funds is higher than the one of internal funds. Moreover,
some firms may find themselves rationed by lenders. At the empirical
level, it has been found that firm investment and cash-flow (a proxy for
change in net worth) are significantly and positively correlated and that
correlation magnitudes are higher for young and small firms, which are
more likely to be exposed to information asymmetries affecting capital
markets.5
As far as long-run economic growth is concerned, a growing body of
literature points out the centrality of firms in the processes of technologi-
cal learning, innovation and diffusion (for a critical overview, see Dosi,
Freeman, and Fabiani (1994); more detailed discussions are in Rosenberg
(1982, 1994), Freeman (1982), and Dosi (1988)). In particular, many
stylized facts reinforce the links between aggregate growth and business
history:
SF7 Firms have a decisive role in the process of technological accumu-
lation. Firms carry out the process of technological learning in
ways which heavily depend on both firm-specific capabilities and
the richness of perceived unexploited opportunities. This implies
that technological learning and accumulation tend to have a local
nature (i.e. technological innovations occur in a neighborhood of
currently-mastered technologies). The cumulativeness of the learn-
ing pattern is shaken by rare, major innovations which determine
changes in the technological paradigms.
4See Hubbard (1998) for a survey.
5See among a vast literature, Fazzari and Athey (1987) and Bond and Meghir (1994).
For a different point of view, see Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Erickson and Whited
(2000).
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7 SF8 Innovation diffusion requires time. The speed of technological dif-
fusion is affected by the presence of information asymmetries and
by the fact that firms need time in order to absorb new
technologies.
SF9 Most innovations are industry-specific. Therefore, it is hard
to invoke macro technological shocks to explain business
fluctuations.
The aforementioned stylized facts concerning innovation and
technology contribute to shape the productivity dynamics of firms.
Detailed studies employing longitudinal microlevel data sets6 highlight
that productivity dynamics is characterized by a few robust statistical
properties:
SF10 Firms are extremely heterogenous in terms of their productivity.
SF11 Productivity differentials among firms tend to be quite persistent
over time.
In addition, heterogeneity is a common property of firm size
distributions both among firms belonging to the same industry and
across different industrial sectors (see, among a vast literature, Bottazzi
and Secchi, 2003a, b).
SF12 Firm size distributions tend to be considerably right skewed, with
upper-tails made of few large firms. These patterns change signifi-
cantly across different industries. SF12 clearly suggests that per-
fect competition does not characterize real-world markets (see
e.g., Bottazzi, Cefis, and Dosi (2002) for a detailed discussion).
Moreover, the empirical evidence on firm growth rate distribu-
tions suggests that firm growth patterns are lumpy, displaying rela-
tively frequent ‘big’—negative or positive—growth events. More
precisely:
SF13 Firm growth-rate distributions are not Gaussian and can be well
proxied by fat-tailed, tent-shaped densities.7
6Cf. the seminal work by Nelson (1981); see also Bartelsman and Doms (2000) and
Dosi (2005) for a survey.
7Castaldi and Dosi (2004) find that SF13 holds also for industries and cross-country
output growth-rate distributions.
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7 In the model developed in Section 4, we embody the stylized facts
pertaining to firms’ investment and innovating patterns described above
(SF5–9) within our artificial firms and we try to replicate as an emergent
property of the macro level both business cycle empirical regularities
(SF1-4) and the microeconomic stylized facts concerning firm pro-
ductivity dynamics (SF10–11) and firm size distributions (SF12–13).
RELATED LITERATURE
As we anticipated in the introduction, our model belongs to the evol-
utionary tradition. In a seminal book, Nelson and Winter (1982)8 show
that long-run macroeconomic growth patterns can be generated starting
from a microeconomic environment populated by heterogenous firms
that have the capabilities to innovate and to imitate their competitors.
However, in the work of Nelson and Winter and in many other papers
belonging to the evolutionary tradition, market demand does not have
any significant role. This prevents to study how ‘Keynesian’ demand
dynamics affects the whole economic system.9 Chiaromonte and Dosi
(1993) and Dosi, Fabiani, Aversi, and Meacci (1994) introduce for the
first time ‘Keynesian’ demand propagation effects in evolutionary models
and try to explore the ensuing dynamics. In particular, Chiaromonte and
Dosi (1993) develop a two-sector model characterized by product and
process innovation, imperfect competition and two feedback loops
resembling the ‘Keynesian’ multiplier and the investment ‘accelerator.’
In a previous paper (Dosi, Fagiolo, and Roventini 2006), we build on
these early templates and we carefully study the statistical properties of
the aggregate time series generated by the simulations. In addition, we
also try to explain the microeconomic stylized facts concerning firm
productivity dynamics and firm size distribution.
A key feature of that work resides in modeling the behavior of firms
by introducing some of the microeconomic regularities described in the
previous section. For instance, we let firms invest in a lumpy fashion
(SF5). In fact, neoclassical economists succeeded in explaining invest-
ment lumpiness as the result of the profit-maximizing behavior of a
8More on the evolutionary perspective is in Dosi and Nelson (1994) and Dosi and
Winter (2002).
9Some evolutionary models analyze the properties of economic fluctuations (e.g.,
Silverberg and Lehnert 1994; Faglolo and Dosi 2003). However, business cycles stem from
some underlying ‘Schumpeterian’ dynamics of innovation and imitation.
ENDOGENOUS BUSINESS CYCLES IN A MULTI-AGENT MODEL 639
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
B
y:
 [R
ov
en
tin
i, 
A
nd
re
a]
 A
t: 
08
:3
4 
14
 S
ep
te
m
be
r 2
00
7 hyper-rational firm (see the literature on (S,s) investment models
10).
However, in those models investment lumpiness crucially depends on
the presence of nonconvex adjustment costs. Consider a profit-maximiz-
ing firm facing the problem of choosing the optimal level of capital. If the
desired capital stock is larger than the current one, the firm will invest
only if the expected additional profits are at least equal to the capital
adjustment costs. The presence of nonconvexities in the adjustment cost
function will force the firm to invest up to the optimal target level of
capital (S) only if its capital imbalance is lower than the optimal trigger
capital stock (s).
Investment lumpiness can lead to non-trivial dynamics at the macro-
economic level. However, in the literature there are almost no works that
try to plug investment lumpiness in a business cycle model.11 In particular,
the microeconomic evidence of firm investment patterns (SF5 and SF6) has
not been employed to explain the business cycle stylized facts (SF1–4).
In this and in our earlier work (Dosi, Fagiolo, and Roventini 2006),
we try to fill this gap. In both models, firms invest in order to expand the
capital stock or to replace scrapped machines. Firms decide their expan-
sion investment according to an (S,s) model. However, in contrast
with the neoclassical literature we do not need nonconvex adjustment
costs in order to generate lumpy investment patterns. We consider firms
as boundedly-rational agents, which adopt routinized behavioral
investment rules (on routinized behaviors, see—within a vast literature—
Nelson and Winter (1982), Dosi (1988), Cyert and March (1989) and,
much earlier, Katona and Morgan (1952)). In particular, the target and
trigger levels of an (S,s)-type investment pattern stem from an investment
routine, instead of some optimizing behavior. Our assumption is
plausible if firms have to cope with an ‘evolutionary environment’ (Dosi,
Marengo, and Fagiolo 2005), where ‘Knightian’ uncertainty does not
allow firms to know the probability distribution of future events (see also
Dosi and Egidi (1991)). In this framework, firms cannot perfectly
anticipate their future demand and follow a (S,s) rule in order to mitigate
the risk connected to unpredictable demand swings. Indeed, firms will
10See Caballero (1999) for a survey of lumpy investment models and Blinder and
Maccini (1991) for a review of (S,s) inventory behavior models.
11An exception is in Thomas (2002) In a real business cycle framework, she finds that
lumpy investment does not have any significant impact at the macro level. See also
Bachman, Caballero, and Engel (2006) for completely opposite results.
640 G. DOSI ET AL.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
B
y:
 [R
ov
en
tin
i, 
A
nd
re
a]
 A
t: 
08
:3
4 
14
 S
ep
te
m
be
r 2
00
7 increase their capital stock only if their (adaptive) expectations suggest a
huge demand growth. Hence, firms will expand their capital stock to
their target level if the expected demand can only be satisfied with a
capital stock at least equal to the trigger level.
Firms follow routines also to decide their replacement investment
strategies.12 More specifically, firms employ a payback-period routine
to replace their stock of heterogenous capital goods. The adoption of
a payback-period rule leads firms to consider technology and capital-
good price in their replacement decisions.
Finally, the investment (and production) policies of firms are
influenced by their financial structure (SF6). In line with the financial
constraint literature discussed above (cf. Section 2.2), firms first rely
on their stock of liquid assets and then on more expensive external funds
(i.e. credit). Moreover, firms are subject to a credit ceiling: the stock of
debt of a firm is limited by its gross cash flows.
The model presented in this article differs from the one in Dosi,
Fagiolo and Roventini (2006) in the following crucial aspects:
. Direct interaction between capital- and consumption-good firms
through the capital-good market (that is now endogenized).
. Additional source of nonlinearities due to time-lags in the production
of machine-tools.
. A more detailed modeling of the process of technical change. Capital-
good firms now search both for new machines and for new production
routines.
. Deep analysis of the role exerted by the nonmarket sector.
The main goal of the exercises we present in this article is to check
whether the new version of the model is able to better reproduce the
existing stylized facts on macroeconomic dynamics on the grounds of
more realistic assumption on firm behavior and market interactions.
As we anticipated in the introduction, our model genuinely belongs to
the ‘agent-based computational economics’ (ACE) tradition. Recently,
ACE models proved to be able to endogenously generate business cycles
and to reproduce many business cycle stylized facts. For example, Delli
12Note that the empirical evidence discussed in Feldstein and Foot (1971), Eisner
(1972), Goolsbee (1998) suggests that replacement investment is not proportional to the
capital stock.
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7 Gatti et al. (2005) showed that an ACEmodel of financial fragility is able to
replicate many scaling-type features concerning the distributions of firm
size, firm growth rates, firm exit, bad debts, profits, GDP expansions, and
recessions. Furthermore, Napoletano et al. (2005) extended the basic
framework inDelli Gatti et al. (2005) tomatch aggregate time-series proper-
ties as well (e.g., volatility, correlation patterns).
Notwithstanding the increasing effort in applying ACE models to the
study of business cycles, there is still a large gap between the wealth of stat-
istical properties uncovered by the empirical literature (both at the micro
and at the macro level, see Section 2) and the performance of economic
models in trying to replicate and explain these stylized facts. The ACE
model that we present in the next section can be considered as a further
(albeit still preliminary) step that we take in the direction of filling this gap.
THE MODEL
We model an economy populated by F firms and L workers=consumers.
Firms belong to two industries: there are F1 consumption-good firms
(labeled by j in what follows) and F2 machine-tools firms (labeled by i).
Of course, F ¼ F1þF2. Consumption-good firms invest in machine-tools
and produce a homogeneous product for consumers. Machine-tool firms
produce heterogenous capital goods and perform R&D. Workers inelas-
tically sell labor to firms in both sectors and fully consume the income
they receive. Investment choices of consumption-good firms determine
the level of income, consumption, and employment in the economy.
In the next subsection, we shall firstly describe the dynamics of
events in a representative time-period. Next, we shall provide a more
detailed account of each event separately.
The Dynamics of Microeconomic Decisions
In anydiscrete time period t ¼ 1, 2, . . . , the timeline of events runs as follows:
1. Capital-good firms advertise their machines sending a ‘brochure’ to a
subset of consumption-good firms.
2. Consumption-good firms take their production and investment deci-
sions. According to their expected demand, firms fix their desired
production and, if necessary, invest to expand their capital stock.
A payback period rule is employed to set replacement investment.
Consumption-good firms choose their supplier and order the
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7 machines. Credit-rationed firms finance their investment, first with
their stock of liquid assets, and next, if necessary, with debt.
3. Both capital- and consumption-good firms hire workers according to
their production plans and start producing.
4. Consumption-good market opens. The size of the consumption-good
demand depends on the number of workers employed by all firms.
Consumption-good firms facing imperfectly informed consumers
receive a fraction of the total demand as a function of their price
competitiveness. Unemployment rates and monetary wage emerge
as the collective outcome of micro-decisions.
5. Capital-good firms deliver the machine-tools ordered by
consumption-good firms.
6. Exit, technical change, and entry take place. Firms facing negative
net-liquid assets and=or zero market-shares exit and they are replaced
by new firms. Capital-good firms stochastically search for new
machines and more efficient production routines.
Finally, total consumption, investment, change in inventories, and total
product can be computed by aggregating individual time-t quantities.
Production and Investment: The Consumption-Good Sector
Each consumption-good firm j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;F1 produces a homogenous
good using machines and labor under constant returns to scale. Planned
output depends on myopic demand expectations of the form:
Dej ðtÞ ¼ Djðt  1Þ; ð1Þ
where Djðt  1Þ is the demand of firm j at time t 1.13
According to the expected demand, the desired level of inventories
(Ndj ) and the inventories (Nj) inherited from the previous period, firms
fix their desired level of production (Qdj ):
Qdj ðtÞ ¼ Dej ðtÞ þ Ndj ðtÞ  Njðt  1Þ; ð2Þ
with Ndj ðtÞ ¼ hDej ðtÞ; 0  h  1.
13Different extrapolative expectation-formation rules based on both firm-specific past
demand and aggregate market signal are explored in Dosi, Fagiolo, and Roventini (2005).
Interestingly, one finds that increasing the computational sophistication of agents does not
improve either the performance of the economy, as measured by average growth-rates, or
the stability of growth patterns over time.
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7 The current stock of capital determines the maximum level of pro-
duction achievable by each firm. Given the desired level of production,
firms compute the desired stock of capital as:
Kdj ðtÞ ¼
Qdj ðtÞ
ud
; ð3Þ
where ud is the desired level of capacity utilization.
Consumption-good firms decide whether to expand14 their stock of
capital following an (S,s) model. They compute their trigger (K
trig
j ) level
of capital as follows:
K
trig
j ¼ KjðtÞð1þ aÞ; ð4Þ
with 0 < a < 1. Firms then plan to increase their capital stock only if the
desired capital stock is higher than the trigger one:
EIjðtÞ ¼
0 if Kdj ðtÞ < Ktrigj ðtÞ
K
trig
j ðtÞ  KjðtÞ if Kdj ðtÞ  Ktrigj ðtÞ
(
; ð5Þ
where EIjðtÞ is the expansion investment.
The stock of capital of each consumption-good firm is heterogenous,
since it is composed of various vintages of machines which differ in
terms of productivity. Machines are measured in terms of their pro-
duction capacity and are normalized to one. They are identified by a
labor productivity coefficient Ai;s, where i denotes their producer and
s their generation (technical change takes place through the creation
of new generation of machines, see Section 4.6 below for details). Let
NjðtÞ be the set of all types of machines belonging to firm j at time t. Firm
j’s capital stock is defined as:
KjðtÞ ¼
X
Ai;s2NjðtÞ
gjðAi;s; tÞ;
where gjðAi;s; tÞ is the absolute frequency of machine Ai;s. Given the
nominal wage wðtÞ, the unit labor cost of each machine is computed as:
cðAi;s; tÞ ¼ wðtÞ
Ai;s
:
14We assume that there are no secondary markets for capital goods. Hence, firms have
no incentives to reduce their capital stock.
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7 Scrapping policies follow a payback-period routine. The replacement
of an incumbent machine depends on its degree of ‘technological’
obsolescence and on the price of new capital goods. More formally, firm
j will scrap machines Ai;s 2 NjðtÞ if they satisfy:
RSjðtÞ ¼ Ai;s 2 NjðtÞ : p
ðtÞ
cðAi;s; tÞ  cðtÞ  b
 
; ð6Þ
where p and c are, respectively, the price and unit labor cost of new
machines, and b is a strictly positive payback-period parameter. Moreover,
firms scrap machines that are older than g periods (g positive integer).
Firms compute their replacement investment by pooling the machines satis-
fying Eq. (6). The level of firm investment (Ij) is the sum of expansion and
replacement investment. Summing up the actual investment of all consump-
tion-good firms, we get aggregate investment (I).
Consumption-good firms choose their capital-good supplier accord-
ing to the price and productivity of the currently produced machines
(cf. Section 4.3) and sends their investment orders.
Consumption-good firms must bear production costs before selling
their output. Hence, they must finance production as well as investment.
In tune with the spirit of the evolutionary perspective—and of many New
Keynesianmodels—we assume imperfect capital markets with credit ration-
ing. Hence, firms will initially employ their stock of liquid assets (NWj) in
order to finance production and investment. If liquid assets are not
sufficient, they will borrow the necessary amount at the interest rate r.
The borrowed amount cannot let the debt=sales ratio exceed the value of K.
Given their current stock of machines, consumption-good firms
compute their average productivity (pj) and their unit cost of production
(cj). Average productivity reads:
pjðtÞ ¼
X
Ai;s2Nj ðtÞ
Ai;s
gjðAi;s; tÞ
KjðtÞ ;
while unit cost of production will be given by:
cjðtÞ ¼ wðtÞpjðtÞ :
Firms fix the price as a mark-up (lj) on their unit cost of production:
pjðtÞ ¼ ð1þ ljðtÞÞcjðtÞ: ð7Þ
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7 The mark-up is flexible: it changes across time according to the past
variation of firm’s market share (fj):
ljðtÞ ¼ ljðt  1Þ 1þ
fjðt  1Þ  fjðt  2Þ
fjðt  2Þ
 
:
Given their average productivity and their production, consumption-
good firms determine their labor demand (LDj ):
LDj ðtÞ ¼
QjðtÞ
pjðtÞ :
Denoting by Sj total sales of firm j, profits (Pj) read:
PjðtÞ ¼ pjðtÞSjðtÞ  cjðtÞQjðtÞ  rDebjðtÞ;
where Debj is the stock of debts. The variation of the stock of liquid
assets of consumption-good firms depends on their profits as well as
on their investment choices:
NWjðtÞ ¼ NWjðt  1Þ þPjðtÞ  cIj ;
where cIj is the amount of internal funds employed by firm j to finance
investment.
The Capital-Good Market
The capital-good market is characterized by imperfect information. This
implies that consumption-good firms have limited knowledge of the
machines supplied in the market.
On the supply side, each machine-tool firm i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;F2 sells its
latest generation of products characterized by labor productivity coefficient
Ai;s, with s ¼ 1; 2; . . .. At the beginning of each period, capital-good firms
try to reduce the information gap that separate them from the consump-
tion-good firms advertising their products. More specifically, capital-good
firms send a ‘brochure’ containing information about the price and pro-
ductivity of their currently produced machine to their historical client
(HCi) as well as to a random sample of potential customers (NCi). The size
of the sample is proportional to the number of the current clients:
NCiðtÞ ¼ ð1þ jÞHCiðtÞ; ð8Þ
with 0 < j < 1. Of course, NCiðtÞ  F1 HCiðtÞ.
On the demand side, consumption-good firms receive ‘brochures’
only from a subset of capital-good firms. Each consumption-good firm
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7 compares the characteristics of the available machines, chooses the one
with the highest productivity=price ratio and sends its investment orders
to the correspondingly capital-good firm.
Machine Production
According to the orders they receive, capital-good firms fix the level of
production (Qi) and start producing. The production process employs
labor only, under constant returns to scale. The unit cost of
production depends on the labor productivity of the firm (Bi):
ciðtÞ ¼ wðtÞ
BiðtÞ :
The price (pi) is equal to the unit cost of production. Given the level of
production and the labor producitivity, capital-good firms compute their
labor demand LDi :
LDi ðtÞ ¼
QiðtÞ
BiðtÞ :
Machine production requires time: machines are delivered to consump-
tion-good firms at the end of the period.
The Consumption-Good Market
Since consumption-good firms take their production decisions according
to their demand expectations, they can obviously make mistakes which
are revealed by variations in inventories. If in the previous period, they
produced too much (Qjðt  1Þ > Djðt  1Þ), they accumulate stocks.
On the contrary, if they were not able to fully satisfy their past demand
(Qjðt  1Þ < Djðt  1Þ), their ‘‘competitiveness’’ (Ej) at time t is reduced:
EjðtÞ ¼ x1pjðtÞ  x2ljðtÞ; ð9Þ
where lj is the level of unfilled demand inherited from the previous period
and x1;2 are non-negative parameters. The average sectorial competitive-
ness (E) is obtained by weighting the competitiveness of each firm with
its past market share (fjðt  1Þ):
EðtÞ ¼
XF1
j¼1
EjðtÞfjðt  1Þ:
Under imperfect information, consumers take time to imperfectly adjust
to relative consumption-good prices. Thus, market shares evolve
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7 according to a replicator dynamics. More specifically, the market share
of each firm will grow (shrink) if its competitiveness is above (below)
the industry-average competitiveness:
fjðtÞ ¼ fjðt  1Þ 1þ vEjðtÞ  EðtÞ
EðtÞ
 
; ð10Þ
with v  0.
Aggregate consumption (cf. Section 4.8) shapes the demand-side of
the market and it is allocated to consumption-good firms according to
their market share:
DjðtÞ ¼ CðtÞfjðtÞ: ð11Þ
Entry, Exit, and Technical Change
At the end of every period, firms with zero market shares and=or nega-
tive net assets die and are replaced by new firms. Hence, the number of
firms in both sectors remains constant across time. We also assume that
each entrant is a random copy of a survived firm.
The economy is fuelled by a never-ending process of technical
change. At the end of each period, capital-good firms try both to develop
the next generation of their machines (product innovation) and to dis-
cover more efficient production routines (process innovation). The result
of their efforts is strongly uncertain.
As far as product innovation is concerned, firms develop a prototype
whose labor productivity (Ai,new) may be higher or lower than the one of
the currently manufactured machine. More formally, we let:
Ai;new ¼ Ai;sð1þ E1Þ; ð12Þ
where E1  U ½i1 ; iþ1 , with1 < i1 < 0 < iþ1 . We also posit that firm i will
release the next generation machine only if it is more productive
(i.e., Ai;new > Ai;s). If the firm decides to produce the new machine, the
index s is accordingly incremented by one unit.
Similarly, firms stochastically search for new production routines.
Firms compare the incumbent and the new production routines affecting
their own labor productivity:
Bi;new ¼ BiðtÞð1þ E2Þ; ð13Þ
where, E2  U ½i2 ; iþ2 , with 1 < i2 < 0 < iþ2 . If Bi;new > BiðtÞ, the firm
adopts the new routine, otherwise it keeps on producing with the old one.
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7 The Labor Market
Labor market is not cleared by real wage movements. As a consequence,
involuntary unemployment may arise. The aggregate supply of labor (L)
is exogenous and inelastic. The aggregate demand of labor is the sum of
machine- and consumption-good firms’ labor demands:
LDðtÞ ¼
XF1
j¼1
LDj þ
XF2
i¼1
LDi ðtÞ:
Hence, aggregate employment (Emp) reads:
EmpðtÞ ¼ minðLDðtÞ;LÞ: ð14Þ
The wage rate is determined by both institutional and market factors,
with both indexation mechanisms upon consumption prices and average
productivity, on the one hand, and, adjustments to unemployment rates,
on the others:
wðtÞ ¼ wðt  1Þ þ 1þ w1
DcpiðtÞ
cpiðt  1Þ þ w2
DAðtÞ
Aðt  1Þ þ w3
DU ðtÞ
U ðt  1Þ
 
;
ð15Þ
where cpi is the consumer price index, A is average labor productivity,
and U is the unemployment rate. The system parameters w1;2;3 allow
one to characterize various institutional regimes for the labor market.
Macro Dynamics, Market Interactions, and Consumption
Scenarios
The dynamics generated at the micro-level by individual decisions and
interaction mechanisms induces, at the macroeconomic level, a stochas-
tic dynamics for all aggregate variables of interest (e.g. output,
investment, consumption, unemployment, etc.).
More precisely, in each time period the decisions undertaken by
firms in the two sectors (e.g. production, investment, pricing) only
depend on (current and lagged) microeconomic variables, and not
directly on the state of macroeconomic variables. However, the current
and past macroeconomic states of the economy (aggregate consumption
level, labor productivity, unemployment rate, etc.) heavily affects micro-
economic decisions, thus introducing non-trivial feedback loops between
micro and macro layers.
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7 In the economic environment, three types of agents (i.e., consump-
tion-good firms, capital-good firms and consumers=workers) interact
in the good and labor markets. In the capital-good market, machine-
tools firms supply heterogenous machines to consumption-good firms,
whose demand depends on the past income of consumers. Capital-good
firms compete by introducing product and process innovations in order
to acquire new customers. In the consumption-good markets, firms pro-
duce a homogenous good trying to match consumers’ demand, which is
related to their income. Consumption-good firms increase their market
share if their price is below the market average. Finally, in the labor mar-
ket the supply is fixed, whereas demand depends on the production
choices of capital- and consumption-good firms.
We consider two scenarios according to the composition of aggre-
gate consumption. In the work-or-die scenario, only employed workers
earn an income that they fully consume:
CðtÞ ¼ wðtÞEmpðtÞ: ð16Þ
In the social-security scenario, unemployed workers do not starve,
but receive a fraction of the market wage from an unmodeled ‘public’
sector:
CðtÞ ¼ wðtÞ½EmpðtÞ þ uðL EmpðtÞÞ; ð17Þ
with 0 < u < 1.
As mentioned above, our model straightforwardly belongs to the
evolutionary, ACE family. Since in general, analytical, closed-form, solu-
tions can hardly be obtained, one must resort to computer simulations to
analyze the properties of the (stochastic) processes governing the
coevolution of micro and macro variables.15
To do so, one should in principle address an extensive Montecarlo
analysis in order to understand how the statistics of interest change
together with initial conditions and system parameters. However, sensi-
tivity exercises show that, in our model, across-simulation variability is
quite low and no chaotic pattern is detected. Hence, we confidently
present below results concerning averages over a limited number of repli-
cations (typically M ¼ 50) as a robust proxy for the behavior of any stat-
istics we compute. Tables 2 and 3 report the values employed for initial
15On the methodology of analysis of evolutionary=agent-based computational eco-
nomics models, see Lane (1993a, b), Dosi and Winter (2002), and Pyka and Fngiolo (2005).
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7 
conditions and parameters. Our choice for initial conditions is done in
such a way that the economy evolves over a steady state in absence of
technical change. All results presented below are robust to variations
of the parameters within a reasonably large neighborhood of the
benchmark parametrization reported in Table 3.
Table 2. Initial conditions
Description Symbol Value
Market wage wð0Þ 1
Consumer price index cpið0Þ 1.3
Average labor productivity Að0Þ 1
Mark-up lð0Þ 0.3
Liquid assets NWi;jð0Þ 10000
Capital stock Kjð0Þ 800
Labor supply Lð0Þ 1000000
Table 3. Benchmark parametrization
Description Symbol Value
Size of consumption-good industry F1 200
Size of capital-good industry F2 50
Econometric sample size T 600
Replicator dynamics coefficient v 0.5
Competitiveness weights x1;2 1
Prod. Innov. Uniform Distrib. Supp. Lower Bound i1 0.5
Prod. Innov. Uniform Distrib. Supp. Upper Bound iþ1 0.5
Proc. Innov. Uniform Distrib. Supp. Lower Bound i2 0.5
Proc. Innov. Uniform Distrib. Supp. Upper Bound iþ2 0.5
Wage setting Dcpi weight w1 0
Wage setting DA weight w2 1
Wage setting DU weight w3 0
Desired inventories parameter h 0.1
Desired level of capacity utilization ud 0.75
Trigger rule a 0.1
Payback period parameter b 8
Maximum machine age g 19
Maximum debt=sale ratio K 2
Consumption-firm sample coefficient j 0.01
Interest rate r 0
Wage share u 0.33
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7 SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section we explore the extent to which the foregoing model is
able to account for the empirical regularities presented in Sections 2.1
and 2.2. To do so, we shall compare simulation results under the
work-or-die and the social-security scenarios described above.
Note that, as mentioned above, the foregoing model embodies in its
microeconomic setup the majority of the stylized facts pertaining to
firms’ investment and innovating patterns described in Section 2,
cf. SF59. The main goal of the analysis is to replicate as emergent
properties both empirical regularities showed by macro time-series
(SF14) and microeconomic stylized facts concerning firm productivity
dynamics (SF1011) and firm size distributions (SF1213).
To begin with, let us look at the outcomes of the model when tech-
nical change is turned off. In this case, the model behaves like the Solow
(1956) growth model: the economy is always in steady state and, since
population is fixed, the output growth rate is zero. At the microeconomic
level, the initial configuration with homogenous firms remains unaltered
as there is neither entry nor exit.
As soon as one turns on technical change, self-sustaining patterns
of growth do emerge (cf. Figures 1 and 2). The economy evolves in a
permanent disequilibrium state characterized by entry and exit of
heterogenous firms interacting both within and among industries.
Figure 1. Work-or-die scenario. Level of output, investment, and consumption.
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Simulated aggregate time-series possess in this case statistical
properties well in line with empirically-observed ones. More precisely,
if we separate the business cycle frequencies of the series by applying a
bandpass filter,16 we observe the typical ‘roller coaster’ shape that char-
acterizes real data (see Figures 3 and 4 and Section 2.1 above). In the
social-security scenario, simulated series of aggregate investment appear
to be more volatile than output (SF1), whereas the opposite seems to
happen in the work-or-die scenario. Finally, aggregate investment and
consumption display a procyclical behavior in both scenarios.
In addition, the model is also able to generate a microeconomic
landscape consistent with the micro ‘stylized facts’ mentioned in Section
2.2. So, for example, the skewed size distributions which emerge in the
simulations are not statistically different from the empirically observed
ones in either scenarios (cf. the rank-size plot in Figure 5).17
Figure 2. Social-security scenario. Level of output, investment, and consumption.
16See Baxter and King (1999). Cf. also Dosi, Fagiolo, and Roventini (2005) for a
discussion of the properties of alternative filtering techniques.
17We employ consumption-good firm sales as a proxy of firm size. Before pooling our
data, we normalize each observation by the year-average of firm size in order to remove any
time trends in our data. This allows one to get stationary size and growth distributions
across years. Due to space constraints, we show the rank-size plot and the firm growth rate
distribution plot for the work-or-die scenario only.
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Furthermore, well in tune with the empirical evidence, pooled firm
growth rates exhibit the typical ‘tent-shaped’ pattern, characterized by
tails fatter than the Gaussian benchmark (cf. Figure 6). More precisely,
we have fitted our simulated firm growth rate distributions with the
Subbotin family of densities.18 We find that simulated growth-rates are
well proxied by Subbotin densities with estimates for the shape-
parameter that robustly suggest a departure from normality in both the
work-or-die and the social-security scenarios (with b^ ¼ 0:32 and
b^ ¼ 0:24, respectively). Notice that our estimates actually entail
growth-rates distributions with tails even fatter than those empirically
observed. We argue that this result is due to the different statistical fea-
tures of real-world and simulated firm growth data samples. On the one
hand, in empirically observed growth-rate distributions, small firms are
typically not included in the sample and any entry-exit turbulence is
washed away by considering surviving firms only. Conversely, in our
simulated data: (i) we do not set any lower bound to the size of firms;
and (ii) we also consider the entry and exit of firms. Both features of
simulated data tend to increase the proportional ‘lumpiness’ of growth
Figure 3. Work-or-die scenario. Bandpass-filtered output, investment, and consumption.
18Subbotin densities include as special cases the Normal (shape parameter b ¼ 2) and
the Laplace (b ¼ 1) distributions. More on the application of the Subbotin family to the fit-
ting of firm growth rates is in Bottazzi and Secchi (2003a, b).
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shocks. In fact, simulation results show that, if one suitably builds
balanced samples of simulated firm growth rates, the estimated shape-
parameter turns out to increase and replicate its empirical counterpart
(e.g. 0:5  b^  1).
Let us now turn to a more detailed study of simulated aggregate
time-series. More specifically, we shall investigate the issue whether
aggregate output, investment, consumption, etc. display statistical
properties similar to the empirically observed ones, as summarized in
SF1–4.
We begin by focusing on the average growth rate (AGR) of the
economy:
AGRT ¼ logY ðT Þ  logY ð0Þ
T þ 1 ; ð18Þ
where Y denotes aggregate output and T is the econometric sample
size.19
We then compute Dickey-Fuller (DF) tests on output, consumption,
and investment in order to detect the presence of unit roots in the
series (all results refer to averages computed acrossM ¼ 50 independent
Figure 4. Social-security scenario. Bandpass-filtered output, investment, and consumption.
19All results refer to T ¼ 600 time-periods, cf. Table 3. This econometric sample size
is sufficient to allow for convergence of recursive moments of all statistics of interest.
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simulations). In both scenarios, the average growth rates of output,
consumption, and investment are strictly positive (1:8%, see Tables 4
and 5). DF tests strongly suggest that output, consumption, and
investment are non-stationary. This result is robust to alternative speci-
fications of DF tests (e.g. considering an intercept term, adding a linear
trend, etc.).
We then detrend the time series obtained from simulations with a band-
pass filter (6,32,12) and compute standard deviations and cross-correlations
between output and the other series. Our simulated figures for relative stan-
dard deviations show that the model is able to match SF2 (i.e. consumption
is less volatile than output) in both scenarios. However, in the work-or-die
scenario, output appears to be more volatile than investment. This result
stems from the fact that our simulated economy does not contain any mech-
anism that contributes to stabilize effective demand, e.g. service industries
and, especially, the government sector. When, as it happens in the social-
security scenario, we include a proxy for the foregoing stabilizing factors,
investment turns to be more volatile that GDP, thus satisfying also SF1.
As far as cross-correlations are concerned, consumption appears to
be procyclical and coincident in both scenarios (cf. Tables 6 and 7). This
matches SF3. Change in inventories appears to be procyclical and
Figure 5. Work-or-die scenario. Pooled (year-standardized) sales distributions. Log rank vs.
log size plots. M-G: Model-Generated distribution.
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coincident in the social-security scenario (SF3), whereas it is slightly lead-
ing in the work-or-die scenario. Investment is instead procyclical and
leading in both scenarios. However, this result is entirely due to the
dynamics of replacement investment. Indeed, net investment is always
procyclical and coincident (SF3).
Finally, our simulated cross-correlation patterns are also quantitat-
ively in line with those obtained by stock and Watson (1999) on US data
(see Figures 7 and 8).
Figure 6. Work-or-die scenario. Pooled (year-standardized) firm growth rates. Binned den-
sities of simulated growth rates vs. Laplace fit. M-G: Model-Generated growth rates.
Table 4. Work-or-die scenario. Output, investment, and consumption statistics. Standard
deviations in parentheses. Dickey-Fuller test specification: No intercept term, no linear
trend, not augmented
GDP Consumption Investment
Avg. growth rate (%) 1.8 (0.007) 1.8 (0.006) 1.8 (0.005)
Dickey-Fuller test (logs) 0.0988 0.9914 0.3692
Sign. level 1 1 1
Dickey-Fuller test (bpf 6,32,12) 5.6450 4.8685 6.2572
Sign. level 0.01 0.01 0.01
Std. Dev. (bpf 6,32,12) 1.1720 0.6198 0.3306
Rel. Std. Dev. (GDP) 1 0.5288 0.2821
ENDOGENOUS BUSINESS CYCLES IN A MULTI-AGENT MODEL 657
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
B
y:
 [R
ov
en
tin
i, 
A
nd
re
a]
 A
t: 
08
:3
4 
14
 S
ep
te
m
be
r 2
00
7 
Notwithstanding we did not model the labor market in details,
empirically-plausible employment series do arise. Indeed, employment
turns out to be procyclical, whereas unemployment rate is counter-
cyclical (SF4). Notice however that the two variables appear to be
coincident. This result may stem from the complete lack of frictions that
characterizes the labor market in our model. Indeed, since in every time
period firms can hire and fire workers without limitations, production
fluctuations pour out in the labor market with no lags.
Furthermore, we have checked whether our model is able to match
microeconomic stylized facts on productivity dynamics (SF10–11). To
do so, we have computed—at each t—the standard deviation of labor
productivities across consumption-good firms in both scenarios.
Table 5. Social-security scenario. Output, investment, and consumption statistics. Standard
deviations in parentheses. Dickey-Fuller test specification: No intercept term, no linear
trend, not augmented
GDP Consumption Investment
Avg. growth rate (%) 1.8 (0.0006) 1.8 (0.0005) 1.8 (0.0017)
Dickey-Fuller test (logs) 2.6816 5.8739 0.3739
Sign. level 1 1 1
Dickey-Fuller test (bpf 6,32,12) 6.3837 6.0359 6.8881
Sign. level 0.01 0.01 0.01
Std. Dev. (bpf 6,32,12) 0.1358 0.0946 0.4357
Rel. Std. Dev. (GDP) 1.00 0.70 3.21
Table 6. Work-or-die scenario. Correlation structure
GDP (bpf 6,32,12)
Series bpf 6,32,12 t 4 t 3 t 2 t 1 t tþ 1 tþ 2 tþ 3 tþ 4
GDP 0.19 0.14 0.54 0.87 1.00 0.87 0.54 0.14 0.19
Consumption 0.09 0.24 0.58 0.85 0.95 0.86 0.59 0.23 0.12
Investment 0.18 0.17 0.08 0.11 0.38 0.64 0.78 0.73 0.50
Change in stocks 0.03 0.17 0.31 0.40 0.39 0.28 0.10 0.10 0.24
Net investment 0.06 0.29 0.49 0.63 0.69 0.63 0.46 0.21 0.07
Employment 0.13 0.17 0.52 0.81 0.96 0.89 0.64 0.28 0.08
Unemployment
rate
0.01 0.25 0.49 0.67 0.75 0.71 0.53 0.26 0.04
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Our results20 indicate that, in tune with SF10, significant asymmetries
persist throughout the history of our simulated economy (see Figure 9).
Moreover, firm-productivity auto-correlations are significantly larger
than zero, thus suggesting persistency in micro productivity differentials
(cf. SF11, see Figure 10).21
Finally, we have explored the distributional properties of pooled,
aggregate-output growth rates. In both the work-or-die scenario and–
for a wide range of u parameter values–in the social-security scenario,
the estimation of the Subbotin shape parameter (b) robustly reveals
departures from normality. Fat tails emerging in aggregate output growth
rates are thus in line with the empirical evidence discussed in Castaldi
and Dosi (2004).
CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have further developed the model presented in Dosi,
Fagiolo and Roventini (2006) in order to better match the set of macro
business cycles stylized facts, which we have described in Section 2.1. We
have done so by keeping rooted the microeconomic level of the model
(i.e. firm behaviors and market interactions) into the microeconomic
20We show results for the work-or-die scenario only.
21Firm-productivity auto-correlations (up to lag 6) are computed by considering
normalized productivity of firms that survived for at least 40 periods in the last 100 periods
of any simulation run.
Table 7. Social-security scenario. Correlation structure
GDP (bpf 6,32,12)
Series bpf 6,32,12 t 4 t 3 t 2 t 1 t tþ 1 tþ 2 tþ 3 tþ 4
GDP 0.38 0.03 0.44 0.84 1.00 0.84 0.44 0.03 0.38
Consumption 0.35 0.04 0.38 0.78 0.98 0.89 0.54 0.08 0.32
Investment 0.19 0.15 0.03 0.18 0.42 0.58 0.58 0.40 0.11
Change in stocks 0.18 0.01 0.24 0.41 0.44 0.31 0.09 0.11 0.21
Net investment 0.26 0.06 0.45 0.76 0.87 0.73 0.41 0.02 0.28
Employment 0.40 0.10 0.33 0.73 0.96 0.91 0.61 0.17 0.23
Unemployment
rate
0.40 0.09 0.33 0.73 0.96 0.91 0.61 0.18 0.22
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evidence discovered in the recent years by a vast empirically-grounded
literature.
We have tried to contribute to the business cycle literature by devel-
oping an evolutionary, ACE model where aggregate output dynamics is
driven by the production and investment choices of heterogenous,
boundedly-rational firms. The model depicts an economy composed of
a capital-good sector and a consumption-good industry. The two sectors
are vertically linked. Capital-good firms innovate introducing new
production techniques and new machines. The latter are sold to
consumption-good firms increasing their productivity.
The model is able to jointly explain many microeconomic and
macroeconomic stylized facts. First, in line with the empirical evidence,
the model generates aggregate output time series showing both self-
sustained growth patterns and recurrent fluctuations. Moreover, the
statistical properties of macroeconomic time series are in line with the
business cycle stylized facts listed in Section 2.1.
Figure 7. Work-or-die scenario. Model Generated (M-G) vs. Empirical Data (S-W: Stock
and Watson, 1999) Cross-correlations.
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Figure 8. Social-security scenario. Model Generated (M-G) vs. Empirical Data (S-W: Stock
and Watson, 1999) Cross-correlations.
Figure 9. Work-or-die scenario. Standard deviations of consumption good firm productivity.
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Second, the model is able to accomodate many microeconomic
empirical regularities (cf. Section 2.2) concerning i) heterogeneity in firm
productivity; ii) persistency in firm productivity differentials; iii) firm
size distributions; iv) firm growth rates distributions.
Third, our work shows that the Keynesian theory of business cycles
can be successfully microfounded employing an evolutionary, ACE
model, where heterogenous, boundedly-rational firms are allowed to
interact and innovate. Indeed, the Keynesian ‘multiplier’ and ‘acceler-
ator’ endogenously emerge and co-evolve shaping the dynamics of the
whole economic system.
We are well aware that building an ACE model that embodies
empirically-supported assumptions and is able to simultaneously replicate
many of micro and macro stylized facts pertaining to business cycles is
just a first step towards a deep understanding of business cycles. Repli-
cation exercises are indeed just a necessary step in order to employ
the model to generate policy implications. The next points in our agenda
concern exactly addressing policy issues related to the role played by
fiscal policy, labor and output markets, and innovation policies. For
example, what is the consequence of introducing taxes in such a way
to compensate public expenditure? Furthermore, what happens when
Figure 10. Work-or-die scenario. Average auto-correlations of consumption-good firm
productivity. Error Bars: þ = Standard Deviation.
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markets are concerned? Finally, what if one compares alternative
mechanisms governing the process through which innovations are
endogenously introduced and diffused in the economy?
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